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PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY
The Historical Development of Criminology
CLARENCE RAY JEFFERY
The author is Professor of Sociology in the Arizona State College at Tempe. He is temporarily on
leave while serving as Research Fellow in the University of Chicago Law School. His earlier publica-
tions in this Journal are: "Crime, Law and Social Structure", 47: at page 423 (Nov.-Dec., 1956) and
"The Development of Crime in Early English Society", 47: at page 647 (March-April, 1957).-
EDITOR.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is a summary statement of the con-
tributions made by the pioneers in crominology.
Sociologists in general and criminologists in
particular have been negligent in their treatment
of the historical development of ideas and theories.'
The Pioneer Series has performed a much needed
service for criminology by reminding us of that
history. Criminologists can benefit from a re-
evaluation of the major contributions made to
criminology and the issues which result therefrom.
The Pioneer Series emphasized something that is
too often ignored in textbooks; namely, the
variety of disciplines which have contributed to
the development of criminology: Law, medicine,
sociology, psychology, psychiatry, chemistry,
physics, architecture, history, theology, and social
work. Many of the issues in criminology are a
result of differences in training and orientation in
various disciplines.
If we understand the pioneers, then we can bet-
ter understand the current issues in criminology.
Tracing the major strands of thought running
throughout the Pioneer Series in terms of theoret-
ical issues, we find at the same time indications of
the ways in which these issues have influenced the
modern criminologist. Twentieth century crimi-
nology is a product of the theories of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. A historical evaluation
of criminology is of no value unless we relate it to
the things which criminologists are doing today. It
is the major thesis of this paper that criminologists
today are interested in certain problems because
they are involved in the theoretical issues de-
veloped by the pioneers. What these issues are
I HowARD BxcEER AND ALvIN BosKOFr, MODERN
SOCIOLOGIcAL TInEORY, New York; Dryden Press,
1957, p. 35 ff.
and the ways in which they influenced modern
criminology are the objectives of this paper.
Criminology involves three different types of
problems:
(1) The problem of detecting the law breaker,
which is the work of the detective, the police
officer, the medical specialist, the chemist; in other
words, the field of criminalistics. The Pioneer
Series article on Hans Gross discusses the pio-
neering work of this man in the field of criminal-
istics.
(2) The problem of the custody and treatment
of the offender once he is detected and legally
judged to be guilty, which is the work of the
penologist. Social workers, psychiatrists, sociol-
ogists, psychologists, juvenile court judges, proba-
tion and parole officers, and others are engaged in
correction work in connection with the prevention
and control of delinquency and crime. Pioneer
Series articles on Haviland, Maconochie, Doe,
Aschaffenburg, Ray, and Maudsley deal with one
or more aspects of correctional work.
(3) The problem of explaining crime and crim-
inal behavior, which is the problem of scientifically
accounting for the presence of crime and criminals
in a society. The legal aspect of crime is of interest
to the lawyer and to the sociologist who is studying
the sociology of criminal law. The explanation of
criminal behavior is of interest to the sociologist,
the psychologist, the psychiatrist, the anthro-
pologist, and the biologist. Pioneer Series articles
on Bentham, Beccaria, Garofolo, Lombroso,
Ferri, Goring, Tarde, Durkheim, and Bonger
deal with crime and criminals from several differ-
ent points of view. The problems associated with
the detection, treatment, and explanation of crime
and criminals are mutually interrelated, and there
is a great deal of overlapping of fields.
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Any attempt to classify the men dealt with in
the Pioneer Series would be arbitrary since each
pioneer wrote about a number of issues from a
number of viewpoints. A classification of the
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Another type of classification, based on whether
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In any historical survey of criminology we must
deal with a dilemma. This dilemma is found in the
Classical School, founded by Bentham and Becca-
ria, and the Positive School, founded by Lombroso,
Garofolo, and Ferri. The Classical School de-
veloped in the eighteenth century in an attempt to
reform the legal system and to protect the accused
against harsh and arbitrary action on the part of
the State. The Positive School developed in the
nineteenth century as an attempt to apply scien-
tific methods to the study of the criminal.
The Classical School defined crime in legal
terms; the Positive School rejected the legal
definition of crime. The Classical School focused
attention on crime as a legal entity; the Positive
School focused attention on the act as a psycho-
logical entity. The Classical School emphasized
free will; the Positive School emphasized determin-
2 See the Pioneer Series articles on LOUBROSO,
GAROFOLO, FERRI, BENTHAM, AND BECCARIA.
ism. The Classical School theorized that punish-
ment had a deterrent effect; the Positive School
said that punishment should be replaced by a
scientific treatment of criminals calculated to
protect society.
The Positive School has dominated American
criminological thinking.3 This school finds sup-
porters in biology, psychiatry, psychology, social
work, sociology, and anthropology, each of whom
applies the concepts of his science to the study of
the criminal. As a result of this orientation, crimi-
nology has been dominated by an interest in the
individual offender: his personality, body build,
intelligence, family background, the neighborhood
from which he comes, or the groups to which he
belongs. The basic assumption since Lombroso's
time is that an explanation of human behavior is an
explanation of crime. The criminologist looks for
the etiology of crime in behavior systems rather
than in legal systems.
DEFINITION OF CRIME
The Classical School defined crime within the
strict limits of criminal law. Bentham placed empha-
sis on the crime, not on the criminal. Bentham was
much more concerned with the consequences of the
act than with the motivation for the act.4 Beccaria
was opposed to the barbaric and arbitrary prac-
tices associated with the court system in England
during his time. He believed in the social contract
theory of government, that is, that sovereignty
resided in the people and the law applied equally
to all members of society. 5 The Classical School
believed in the doctrine of nullum crimen sine lege,
no crime without a law.
The Positive School attacked the legal definition
of crime, and in its place substituted a concept of
natural crime. The positivist rejected the juridical
concept of crime in favor of the sociologic notion of
crime.6 Garofolo notes that the concept of a
"criminal" presupposes the concept of "crime."
He observed that "although the naturalists speak
'JEROME HALL, CRINOLOGY, TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY SOCIOLOGY, ed. by GEORGES GURviTCH AND
WILBERT E. MOORE, New York: Philosophical Press,
1945, p. 346.
4 GILBERT GEIS, Pioneers in Criminology, VII:
Jeremy Bentham, JouR. OF CRim. L., CRlIINOL., AND
POL. Sci., July-August, 1955, pp. 159-171.
5 ELIO MONACHESI, Pioneers in Criminology, IX:
Cesare Beccaria, JouR. OF CRit. L., CRIMINOL., AND
POL. Sci., November-December, 1955, pp. 439-449.
6 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, Pioneers in Criminology, IV:
Ra.ffaele Garofolo, JouR. OF CRISI. L., CRmINOL., AND
POL. SCI., November-December, 1954, pp. 373-390.
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of the criminal, they have omitted to tell us what
they understand by the word crime."7 The posi-
tivist's rejection of the legal definition was based
on the idea that for scientific purposes the concept
of crime cannot be accepted as a legal category,
since the factors which produce the legal definition
are contingent and capricious. Garofolo then
defined natural crime as an act that offends the
moral sentiments of pity and probity in the com-
munity. Allen and Hall have pointed out the fact
that the positivistic notion of crime is susceptible
to corruption in the hands of corrupt political
officials. The fact that Ferri became a member of
the Fascist movement in Italy is of concern to
those who regard civil liberties as a fundamen-
tal aspect of criminal law.8 Whereas for Beccaria
individual rights are supreme; there are no safe-
guards against abuse of state power in the work
of Garofolo and Ferri.9
As a result of the rejection of legal categories by
the Positive School there is no agreement in crimi-
nology today as to "what is crime?" Sutherland,
Reckless, Sellin, Clinard, and others have either
rejected the legal definition of crime or have
stated that criminological research should not be
limited by such legal definitions.10 The most com-
mon definition of crime by the sociological school
is the definition of crime as "anti-social" behavior.
Sellin states that criminologists should study
violations of conduct norms rather than legal
norms. The eminent British criminologist, Profes-
sor Hermann Mannheim, is in agreement with
Sellin's position. Mannheim asks the question, "Is
criminology concerned exclusively with criminal
behavior in the legal sense or rather with the much
wider conception of anti-social behavior?"" He
answers the question by noting that criminology
tends to become the science of undesirable social
behavior.Y "It is the object of Criminology to
study criminal behavior and the physical, psycho-
logical, and socio-economic factors behind it; how
and why people commit crimes .... ,"" Mannheim
7 Ibid., p. 375.8 THoRsrxN SELLIN, Pioneers in Criminology, XV:
Enrico Ferr, Joun. OF CRti. L., CRMINOL., AND
POL. Scr., January-February, 1958, p. 489. See also
HALL, op. cit., p. 346 if; ALLEN, op. cit., pp. 373-390.
9 ALLEN, op. cit., p. 389.
10 CLARENCE RAY JEFFERY, The Structure of American
Criminological Thinking, JouR. OF CRim. L., CRImINOL.,
AND POL. Scr., January-February, 1956, p. 658 ff.It HERMANN MANNHEIm, GRoUP PROBLEMs IN
CRIME Am PUNIsHMENT, London: Routlege and
Kegan Paul, 1955, p. 261.
2 Ibid., p. 262.
1 Ibid., p. 261.
focuses attention on criminal behavior while at the
same time removing the study of law from the
field of criminology. "While it is no doubt one of
the functions of the Sociology of the Criminal Law
to examine the conditions under which criminal
laws develop, such an examination cannot be
regarded as coming under the scope of Criminol-
ogy.'
4
Opposition to the definition of crime as anti-
social behavior or undesirable behavior have come
from Jerome Hall, Francis A. Allen, Paul Tappan,
George B. Vold, Robert G. Caldwell, and the
writer.' 5 Hall writes, "Criminology is synonymous
with Sociology of Criminal Law .... The above
theory suggests the general boundaries of criminol-
ogy. It must be concerned, first, with the meaning
of the rules of criminal law . .. and this requires
investigation of their origins, the legislative his-
tory,... and accompanying social problems." 6
Hall traced the development of the law of theft
from the Carrier's Case to the present in order to
show how the criminal law has developed in
response to social and economic changes brought
about by the Industrial Revolution. The interrela-
tions of law and economy in the solution of social
problems are highlighted in his book, Theft, Law
and Society." Francis A. Allen states, "It may be
doubted that so complete an elimination of the
legal content of the concept has well served the
development of criminological theory."
S
The view that crime is undesirable social be-
havior is especially apparent in the field of juvenile
delinquency. The broad legal definition of delin-
quency makes it possible to equate "delinquency"
with "problem behavior." Paul Tappan refers to
this situation as "legal nihilism." He notes that
a juridicial approach to delinquency is uncommon,
and in its place we find a casework approach that
is nonlegal or anti-legal in orientation. 9 Roscoe
Pound observed that the discretionary power of
the Star Chamber was a trifle compared to that
'" Ibid., p. 260.
"5 JEFERY, op. cit; ROBERT G. CALDwELL, CRIM-
NOLOGY, New York: Ronald Press, 1956, p. 112 ff.,
p. 67 ff.; HALL, op. cit.; ALLEN, op. cit.; GEORGE B.
VOLD, Some Basic Problens in Criminological Research
FED. PROB., March, 1953, p. 37.
16 JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINcIPLEs OF CRIMINAL
LAW, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1947, p. 559.
17 JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY, 2nd
ed., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1952.
.ALLEN, op. cit., p. 377.
"PAUL W. TAPPAN, CONTEMPORARY SURVEY OF




of the juvenile court.20 A juvenile court hearing is
not regarded as a criminal trial; therefore, the usual
constitutional guarantees as to life and liberty do
not apply. The juvenile is often deprived of legal
rights which are available to the adult.21
Because there is no standard from which delin-
quent behavior can be measured, a subjective
evaluation of the behavior by a judge or caseworker
must be relied upon. What constitutes "vulgar lan-
guage," "idleness," "immorality," or "habitually"
is a major problem in the administration of any ju-
venile court code.n The jurisdiction of the juvenile
court is often based on the fact that the child has
an emotional problem rather than on any act of
delinquency. There is some question as to whether
the juvenile court should function as a welfare
agency. "It is even more pathetic that the very
social instrument that was once hailed as a great
reform measure now stands as a barrier to progress
in meeting their basic needs." 24
The confusion of crime and criminals is com-
monplace in criminology. The criminologist seeks
the answer to crime in the behavior of the offender
rather than in the criminal law. Ferri stated that
"crime must be studied in the offender."25 The
question "why and how people commit crimes" is
an important one; however, a theory of behavior
is not a theory of crime. Behavior is criminal only
when judged by some standard of conduct. The
term "crime" refers to the act of judging or labeling
the behavior, rather than to the behavior itself.
Why people behave as they do and why the be-
havior is regarded as criminal are two separate
problems requiring different types of explanation.
If we wish to include all anti-social behavior
within the scope of criminology, we must either
state that all deviant behavior is criminal or that
criminology is concerned with non-criminal as well
as criminal behavior. What we are concerned with
in either case is the sociology of deviant behavior,
not the sociology of crime. Only in the criminal
law do we find the distinction between criminal
and non-criminal behavior. People are executed or
sent to prison for violating a law; they are not
executed or sent to prison for "anti-social" be-
havior in general. Sellin points out that man be-
2 0
HERBERT A. BLOCH! AND FRANK T. FLYNN,
DELmNQuENCY, New York: Random House, 1956, p.
320.
21 Ibid., p. 305 ff.
2 Ibid., p. 313
22Ibid., p. 322
24 Ibid., p. 337
2" SELLIN, op. cit., p. 482
longs to many different social groups, each with its
own system of conduct norms. However, when he
states that the criminologist ought to study all
norms violations he ignores the fundamental and
important differences between state norms, famil-
ial norms, religious norms, educational norms,
economic norms, or voluntary association norms.
By placing all conduct norms in a single category
he is overlooking certain important characteristics
of the norms.
The removal of crime from the realm of legal
fact has blurred the distinction between criminal
and non-criminal behavior. In textbooks it is
common to observe that 99 percent of the popula-
tion commit acts for which they could be charged
with a crime.26 Less than 4 percent of the crimes
known to the police result in a prison sentence.N
These observations place the criminologist in a
cul-de-sac. If he is to ignore the legal status of
crime, he then must study all deviant behavior.
This is an acceptable procedure if one is interested
in explaining behavior; it is not too helpful if we
wish to understand why individual A is in prison
and individual B is not. From these statistical
observationsof non-criminal populations we must
conclude that they differ from criminal popula-
tions, not in terms of sociological and psychological
variables related to the life experiences of the
individual offender, but in terms of the process of
legal adjudication. The criminal has been caught
and convicted in a court of law. The problem
shifts from "why and how individuals commit
anti-social acts" to "why and how criminal law is
administered."
The problem of the "non-adjudicated" criminal
concerned Sutherland a great deal, and his re-
search in connection with white-collar crime was
an attempt to bring within the scope of criminology
the criminal who was not in prison. He defined
white-collar crime as "socially injurious acts"
whether conviction occurred or not, a concept
that has been criticized by Tappan and Caldwell.28
Sutherland made a valuable contribution to the
sociology of law by pointing out the differential
treatment of white-collar criminals by our judicial
system. However, he did not focus attention on
the interaction of economic and legal institutions
in the same way that Jerome Hall did, for example,
in his study of theft. Sutherland shifted his atten-
2 6 WALTER C. RECKLESs, THE CRIME PROBLEM,
New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, Inc., 1955, p. 12.21 Ibid., p. 18.
2 CALDWELL, op. cit., p. 67 ff.
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tion to the question "why do certain individuals
commit white-collar crimes?" He entered into a
discussion of a shoe salesman who became a white-
collar criminal through differential association. 9
The problem of what social changes in the nine-
teenth century produced government regulation of
business is ignored in Sutherland's work. The legal
dimension of white-collar crime is slighted in favor
of a study of the offender. In Sutherland's work we
have a beautiful example of the shift in emphasis
from the crime to the criminal. White-collar crime
did not exist before certain legal changes occurred.
Why these changes occurred can be determined
only by a study of law and society, not by a study
of the criminal. The progress and development of
criminal law has been due to social and economic
historical forces. No evaluation of the personality
of the individual criminal is going to substitute for
a sociological analysis of law.
The acceptance by many criminologists of the
Positive School's position in respect to the defini-
tion of crime and the emphasis placed on the study
of the individual offender is not surprising if one
considers the history of American sociology. The
original problem which occupied the attention of
sociologists during the period from 1910 to 1939
was the problem of socialization and personality
development. The work of W. I. Thomas, G. H.
Mead, John Dewey, and C. H. Cooley was in the
area of socialization. These men were interested in
the question of how a person comes to be a member
of a group. It mattered little whether the social
norms involved were legal or non-legal in nature.
It was not until the late 1930's that there occurred
in American sociology a revival of interest in
European sociologists such as Weber, Durkheim,
Tonnies, Sombart, and others. 0 The problem of
social structure and social institutions now as-
sumed a more important place in sociological dis-
cussions. The sociology of law is a European im-
port, based on the work of such European writers
as Weber, Durkheim, Maine, Jhering, Ehrlich,
Gurvitch, Sorokin, and Timasheff. 3' It is of interest
to speculate as to why sociologists in the United
States did not develop an interest in the study of
law until quite recently.
One additional observation concerning the defi-
nition of crime is in order. If we define crime as the
19 EDvWN H. SUTHERLAND, VHITE COLLAR CRIME,
New York: Dryden Press, 1949, p. 235 ff.
1o BECKER AND BosKOFF, op. cit., p. 79 ff.31 BECKER AND BOSKOr,, op. cit., p. 424 ff.; TwEN-
TIETH CENTURY SOCIOLOGY, op. cit., p. 297-341.
violation of a law, we must then state what we
mean by law. This would require us to investigate
such topics as the sociology of law and sociological
jurisprudence. If we equate law and custom, as
some writers do, then the legal definition of crime
and the social definition of crime are synonymous.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to pursue
further the various meanings of the term "law"
except to note that the definition of crime, be it
legal or sociological, must be based on a study of
law and society rather than on a study of the
individual offender.
Is CRMINoLoGY A SCIENCE?
According to George B. Void, "the essential
point in positivism is the application of a determin-
istic and scientific method to the study of crime."12
This writer would disagree with Vold's observa-
tion to this extent: the main characteristic of
positivism is its attempt to answer the riddle of
criminality by means of scientific studies of the
individual offender. The use of scientific method
is one of the major characteristics of positivism;
however, scientific studies can be made of crime
and criminal law as well as of the criminal. Because
of his orientation the criminologist has not con-
cerned himself with these other theoretical issues.
The reason the criminologist is not interested in
studying law and society is his reform orientation.
There is no way in which knowledge of law and
society can be used to reform the criminal. The
criminologist assumes that he must reform the
criminal if the science of criminology is to be a
success. When this writer recently advocated that
greater attention be paid to the study of criminal
law he was told by several probation officers, "But
this does not help us to deal with the individual
offender." Criminology has developed to a great
extent as a branch of the penal reform movement
in the United States. The major problems in
criminology have been derived from the needs of
parole boards and prison administrators for tools
with which to reform or manage criminals. The
interest shown in parole prediction tables and
prison research is illustrative of this reform orienta-
tion. The development of criminology is limited
by this interest in penal reform and prison prob-
lems.
Auguste Comte is the father of positivism in
sociology. He envisioned a society in which all
12 GEORGE B. VOLD, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 39.
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social problems are solved by scientists using
positivistic methods of research. When society
reaches the positive stage of development morals
and politics will become positivistic sciences.
Positivism subordinates questions about what
ought to be or what must be to questions of what in
fact is. "Positivistic thinkers .... have wished to
see intelligence applied to the alleviation of all
pressing human ills." Auguste Comte "was first
and foremost a social reformer, and he was inter-
ested in science because he thought of it as an
instrument for the reorganization of human life."3
America has developed a philosophy, which, like
Comte's takes its point of departure from the
disparity between the state of the natural sciences
and the state of social affairs, and which proposes
to eliminate this disparity by extending the
scientific outlook to all domains of human be-
havior.N
The positivistic view of Comte was offset by the
development of a German school of sociology. The
German school made a distinction between the Sein
and the Sollen, the is and the ought. Max Weber
regarded sociology as value-free. Sociology is
concerned with what is; it does not attempt to
determine ethical and moral issues. Weber recog-
nized that values are facts which can be scientifi-
cally analyzed. He also recognized the fact that
sociology does not furnish answers to questions
concerning how people ought to behave. Weber
made a distinction between natural and social
science, a distinction which the positive school
has denied. 5 Most American sociologists follow
the value-free approach. Robert Bierstedt writes,
"Sociology is a categorical, not a normative disci-
pline, that is, it confines itself to statements about
what is, not what ought to be." 36 Kingsley Davis
writes, "The normative approach (in the sense of
analyzing norms and institutions, not in the sense
of laying down moral imperatives) is used. .... 31
Talcott Parsons states, "Existence and values are
a3 A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS, ed. by
VERGILIrUs FEiR, New York: Philosophical Library,
1950, p. 330-331.
34Ibid., p. 337.
3 5JOHN CURER, SOCIOLOGY, 3rd ed., New York:
Appleton-Century-Croft, Inc., 1955, p. 42 ff.; RALPH
ROSS AND ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, THE FABRIC OF
SocIETY, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1957
p. 273 ff.36 ROBERT BIERSTEDT, THE SOCIAL ORDER, New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957, p. 11.
37KINGSLEY DAVIS, HUMAN SOCIETY, New York:
Macmillan Co., 1949, p. 80.
intimately related and interdependent, and yet...
conceptually distinct.",
The positivistic position established by Comte
is found today in such works as George Lundberg's
"Can Science Save Us?" In his writings Lundberg
argues that, by emulating the physical sciences
and by using statistical and quantitative tech-
niques of analysis, sociology can be used as a tool
for obtaining social objectives. Lundberg, fol-
lowing John Dewey and the pragmatists, regards
science as an instrument of human adjustment and
human progress. The final objective of science is
the prediction and control of events which is
possible when one uses mathematical models.
Lundberg agrees with Weber that sociology must
be free of values and value-judgments. He feels
that science can furnish us with the means to reach
the goals or ends which are existent in society. The
major tenets of positivism are quantitativism,
behaviorism, and pragmatism. 39
According to Weber the purpose of sociology is
to understand social events; according to Comte
and Lundberg the purpose of sociology is to aid
in the scientific solution of social problems. Crimi-
nologists in general have followed the Positive
School. Crominologists are very anxious that crim-
inology be recognized as a science. They believe
that the crime problem can be solved if criminology
is scientific. That is why the criminologist has
been willing to reject the legal definition of crime
in favor of "universal categories of behavior"
which he feels is necessary for scientific analysis.
The Michael-Adler report concluded that criminol-
ogy is not a science due to the unscientific nature
of sociology and psychology.40
Whether or not we regard criminology as a
science depends upon the use to which we want to
put our knowledge. Scientific studies can be made
of crime, criminal law, criminals, prisons, and other
such topics. In this sense a science of criminology is
possible. If we believe, however, that science can
determine the policy to be pursued in the
treatment of criminals then we are no longer
within the realm of science. Punishment and
38 KENNETH S. CARLSTON, LAW AND STRUCTURES
OF SOCIAL ACTION, London: Stevens and Sons, 1956,
p. 20.
31BECYER AND BOsKoFF, op. cit., p. 86; ROSCOE
AND GISELA HINELE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN
SOCIOLOGY, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954, p.
54 ff.; GEORGE SIMSON, MAN IN SOCIETY, New York:
Doubleday and Co., 1955, p. 48 ff.
40THE SUrHERAND PAPERS, edited by ALBERT
COHEN, ALFRED LiNDESMITH, AND KARL SCHUESSLER,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956, p. 229 ff.
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reform are not a means to an end; they represent
goals or values. Science cannot determine the
ultimate values of society. Even an extreme posi-
tivist such as Lundberg feels obliged to make a
distinction between science and policy. The advo-
cates of the "New Penology" ignore this issue.
Studies of criminals and prisons will never tell us
how we ought to treat the criminal any more than
studies of the atom will tell us how we ought to
use the atomic bomb. In the next several sections
of the paper free will, determinism, and punish-
ment will be discussed in terms of this distinction
between the is and the ought.
TE CR IMIAL
Lombroso is generally credited with shifting
the criminologist's attention from the crime to the
criminal. Since his time the major issue has been
"how and why do people commit crimes?" Atten-
tion has been focused on the individual offender.
The history of criminology is thehistoryof theories
of personality development. Whenever a new
theory of personality appears, it is immediately
applied to the criminal. Textbooks in criminology
tell us a great deal about the physical, mental,
emotional, and social characteristics of the crimi-
nal.
The biological school was developed by Lom-
broso, Garofolo, Ferri, and Goring. Lombroso
started with the concept of the born criminal, but
he in his later writings recognized other factors as
being important. Ferri emphasized the importance
of anthropological and social as well as physical
factors. Ferri classified criminals as born, insane,
habitual, occasional, and passionate. Goring dis-
covered through his measurements of English
convicts that the criminal was physically and
mentally inferior to the non-criminal. It is of
interest to note that Tarde, not Goring, is respon-
sible for the refutation of Lombroso. Edwin Driver
in his article points out that the American crimi-
nologist has credited Goring with the refutation of
Lombroso while ignoring the biological orientation
of his work.4' The interest in heredity and consti-
tutional types is still seenin thewritings of Hooton,
Sheldon, and the Gluecks.
The mental testers attempted to locate the
cause of criminal behavior in mental defectiveness.
41 EDWIN D. DRIVER, Pioneers in Criminology, XIV:
Charles Goring, Jomw or Cans. L., CRIMINOL., AND
PoL. Sci., January-February, 1957, pp. 515-525.
MARGARET S. WIISON, Pioneers in Criminology, I:
Gabriel Tarde, JouR. or Cals. L., CilMNor., AND
POL. Sci., May-June, 1954, pp. 3-10.
Henry Goddard is representative of this stage of
criminological thinking.
Tarde located the cause of criminal behavior in
imitation, and it is a short step from Tarde to
Sutherland. Guerry and Quetelet emphasized the
importance of criminal statistics in relation to
ecological processes, age, sex, climate, and other
variables. Park, Burgess, Shaw, and McKay de-
veloped the ecological school in the United States,
work which was basic to the formulation of Suther-
land's theory. Bonger emphasized poverty and
economic conditions as a factor in criminality, and
many studies have been made in an attempt to
relate crime rates to economic conditions.
The Freudian theory of personality development
has been used by psychiatrists as a basis for ex-
plaining criminal behavior. The psychiatric ap-
proach is both individualistic and social psycho-
logical depending upon the school of psychiatry to
which one belongs. Both the sociological and psy-
chiatric schools emphasize the importance of the
family in relation to crime. The sociologist empha-
sizes the environmental and associational aspects
of family living; the psychiatrist emphasizes the
emotional aspect of family living. The two major
explanations of behavior today are the sociological,
symbolized by Sutherland, and the psychiatric,
symbolized by Freud.4-
The shift from the biological orientation of
Lombroso to the social and psychological orienta-
tion of the modern criminologist has misled some
as to the true influence of the Positive School on
modern criminology. If the term "positivist" is
applied to Sutherland, for example, someone will
object because Sutherland's theory of behavior is
not the same as Lombroso's. The importance of
the Positive School is that it focused attention on
motivation and on the individual criminal. It
sought an explanation of crime in the criminal, not
in the criminal law. This is true of every theory of
criminal behavior which is discussed in the text-
books today, even though the explanation is in
terms of social and group factors rather than in
terms of biological factors. The shift in criminologi-
cal thinking has been from a biological to a socio-
logical and psychological explanation of behavior,
not in terms of a shift in interest from the criminal
to crime. The emphasis is still upon the individual
offender, not crime.
When the definition of crime was discussed
above, it was noted that the reason the crimi-
42 CAMWnLL, op. Cit., p. 181 ff.
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nologist feels the need to reject legal definitions of
crime is because he is seeking a universal category
of behavior that can be explained in terms of a
theory of behavior. If one is attempting to explain
motivation and behavior, one cannot rely upon
legal categories for the obvious reason that the
same behavior pattern will be both legal and il-
legal at different times and in different places.43
Regardless of whether we accept Lombroso's
theory of behavior, or Sheldon's theory, or Suther-
land's theory, or Glueck's theory, we are still
dealing with the criminal, not crime. Sutherland's
theory of differential association is a theory of
behavior, based on a study of criminals. The only
reason the issue of a definition of crime is raised in
modern criminology is because the criminologist
has to have some device by which to place be-
havior in that category before it is studied as such.
However, the criminologist is in a real dilemma in
this respect, since as soon as he has derived his
universal category of behavior he has lost the
very thing he started out to study, namely crime.
Two major difficulties confront us today in
respect to the problem of understanding the
criminal. (1) A theory of criminal behavior is not
a theory of crime. It does not explain why the be-
havior is criminal or non-criminal. (2) There is no
theory of criminal behavior available which ex-
plains all criminal behavior. The psychiatric theory
is inadequate because not all criminals are emo-
tionally disturbed, and few emotionally disturbed
individuals are criminals. The sociological explana-
tion is inadequate because not all criminals have a
history of prior associations with other criminals,
and not all individuals who associate with crimi-
nals become criminals. A theory which integrates
the legal, sociological, and psychological aspects of
crime and criminal behavior is needed.14
In his study of the individual criminal the crimi-
nologist has confused two distinct and separate
sociological processes: institutionalization and
socialization.
The individual learns group-defined ways of
acting and feeling, and he learns many of them so
fundamentally that they become a part of his
11 JEFFERY, op. cit., p. 671 ff.44 The writer has outlined some of the problems in
such an approach to criminological theory in an article
entitled An Integrated Theory of Crime and Criminal
Behavior published in the March-April, 1959 issue of
the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police
Science.
personality. The process of building group values
into the individual is called socialization. 45
Socialization is the sociologist's inclusive term
for the various processes through which the original
nature becomes fashioned into the social being....
A major part of a socialization process consists, of
course, of learning."
By institutionalization we mean the develop-
ment of orderly, stable, socially integrating forms
and structures cut of unstable, loosely patterned,
or merely technical types of action!7
Sociologists have coined the term institutionaliza-
tion to describe the process of formalizing interac-
tion in groups. There is a tendency for participation
in most groups to become habituated and forma-
lized into increasingly rigid roles. Each person's
behavior becomes laid out for him in specific ways,
and elaborate rules and regulations exist pre-
scribing the proper procedure."
The process of learning behavior expected of a
person in the group is socialization. Sutherland's
theory of differential association is a theory of
socialization. Non-sociological theories of behavior
place little or no emphasis on socialization proc-
cesses. On the other hand, the way in which law
develops in response to social problems and social
change is institutionalization. Jerome Hall's study
of "Theft, Law and Society" or the writer's study of
crime and social change in England are examples
of studies of institutionalization.49 Crime is a
product of institutionalization; behavior is a
product of socialization. The confusion of crime
and behavior is the confusion of institutionalization
and socialization.
FREE WILL VERsUS DETERMI-NISM
Whereas the Classical School accepted the
doctrine of free will, the Positive School based the
study of criminal behavior on scientific determin-
ism. Every act had a cause. The Pavlovian theory
of conditioned response patterns strengthened the
deterministic approach to behavior. John B. Wat-
son made determinism popular in the United
45 
LEONARD BROOM AND PHILIP SELZNICK, SOCIOLOGY,
Evanston: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1955, p. 81.
6 CUBER, Op. cit., p. 180.47 BROOM AND SELzNICK, op. cit., p. 238.
'8 CUBER, op. cit., p. 319.49 JEROMrE HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY, Op. Cit.;
CLARENCE RAY JEFFERY, Crime, Law and Social
Structure, JOUR. OF CRim. L., CrIsNOL., AND POL.
Sci., November-December, 1956, p. 423 ff.; CLARENCE
RAY JEFFERY, The Dedelopment of Crime in Early
English Society, JouR. or CRni. L., CRmtMNOL. AND
POL. ScI., March-April, 1957, p. 647 ff.
[Vol. 50
DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY
States at about the same time that Freud intro-
duced the theory of psychic determinism.
The major argument today concerning determin-
ism occurs in the criminal law. The law assumes
the responsibility of the individual for his volun-
tary conduct. The Neo-Classical School recognized
that infants, lunatics, and others were not legally
responsible for their actions. The legal position
has been under attack by psychiatrists for many
years.5 The Pioneer Series articles on Isaac Ray,
Charles Doe, and Henry Maudsley dealt with this
issue of legal versus psychological responsibility.
The legal test of insanity, the right and wrong
test as stated in the McNaghten case, has been
criticized by psychiatrists. Ray and Doe were
influential in setting aside the McNaghten rule
in the state of New Hampshire. The New Hamp-
shire rule was applied in the case of United States
vs. Durham. In the Durham case the court said,
"The accused is not criminally responsible if his
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
mental defect."
Psychiatrists in general are in favor of the Dur-
ham rule. Nearly ninety per cent of the psychia-
trists interviewed concerning the test of criminal
responsibility indicated that they favored the
Durham test."1 The Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment recommended abrogating the Mc-
Naghten test and leaving it to the jury "to deter-
mine whether at the time of the act the accused
was suffering from disease of the mind to such a
degree that he ought not to be held responsible."-
The acceptance of the psychiatric position by
lawyers and courts is a current trend. The late
George Dession stated in 1938 that "the infiltra-
tion of psychiatry into the administration of
criminal law will one day be recognized as over-
shadowing all other contemporary phenomena in
its influence on the evolution of criminal justice." 5
Fredric Wertham, a psychiatrist, regards this as a
dangerous trend in the administration of justice."
In the issue of criminal responsibility we again
witness dearly the influence of the Positive School.
The criminal rather than the crime is the issue at
hand. Scientific determinism replaces volitional
conduct. The inner motivation of the act replaces
50oJERomE HALL, Psyciatry and Criminal Re-
sponsibility, YAm L. Joun., May, 1956, p. 761 ff.;
HALL, PRiNcipLEs, op. cit., p. 477 ff.
51 Uiim .ysr oF CHICAGo LAW REVIEW, Winter
1955, p. 327.
2 Ibid., p. 356.
1 Ibid., p. 363.
5 Ibid., p. 581.
the overt harm or consequence of the act. The
innermost aspect of the psyche is explored in an
effort to answer the question "how and why do
people commit crimes?" The evaluation of be-
havior is placed in the hands of experts. Fredric
Wertham feels that the McNaghten rule should
be retained, and he refers to the psychiatric posi-
tion as "psychoauthoritarianism."55 Robert G.
Caldwell refers to the general movement away
from judicial procedures as "the tyranny of the
expert.""0
The argument that scientific determinism ought
to replace free will is always framed in terms of
psychic determinism. When the psychiatrist offers
testimony he is doing so in terms of certain con-
cepts he has concerning determinism. An issue
which seems to have been systematically ignored
is that there are also sociological determinants of
behavior. Why do we allow a defendent the
defense that certain psychic factors determined
his behavior, if we do not allow the same defense
to the man who has lived in a criminalistic sub-
culture and whose behavior is therefore determined
by his environment? Why not have sociologists
testifying as to the environmental determinants
of the behavior of a Negro male living in Harlem?
Certainly this individual did not will to be born a
Negro or to live in Harlem. The writer is not sug-
gesting this as a policy, but is asking the question
"why has the discussion of determinism been con-
cerned solely with psychic determinism?"
The law is a measure of social, not individual,
responsibility. The law assumes that individuals
are responsible for their actions, for otherwise a
state of social anarchy would exist. The deter-
ministic argument assumes that responsibility and
free will are synonymous, and that determinism
precludes responsibility.5 It can be argued that
unless a person is conditioned to expect certain
consequences for his action he is not aware of the
prohibitions and thus is not responsible. Deter-
minism leads to responsibility. It is on the basis of
these anticipated consequences of behavior that
society holds the individual responsible. The
socialization process is based on role-taking proc-
esses which allow one to anticipate the conse-
quences of his behavior and thus one orients his
behavior toward the significant other. The late
Robert Lindner expressed it in these terms, "Be-
55 Ibid., p. 336.
-6 CAI vDixE, op. cit., p. 342.
57 Ross AND VAN DEN HAAO, op. cit., p. 295 ff.
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cause every act involves other persons, and most if
not all actions at the time of their inception include
some foreknowledge of their potential effects, a
network of responsibility exists among all members
of the species."n Kenneth S. Carlston writes,
"Responsibility on the part of the members for the
effective performance of their roles in accordance
with accepted norms is another distinguishing
feature of the organization (of society)."59 Not only
is the concept of responsibility necessary for the
function of society but for the understanding of
the social psychology of personality development.
Coutu has suggested the term "social accounta-
bility" in place of responsibility, and perhaps such
a term would be preferred by those who think of
responsibility in terms of free will. 60 This is similar
to the position taken by Enrico Ferri, namely that
a person is legally or socially responsible for his
actions by the fact that he is a member of society,
not because he is capable of willing an illegal act.
Ferri applied the concept of responsibility to the
insane, to juveniles, and to others now regarded as
being incapable of responsibility. 1 Arnold Green
has written:
The first proposition-that the criminal is not
responsible for his crimes-is inconsequential, at
least from the point of view of maintaining society.
Whether or not a man is responsible for what he
does, he must be held personally accountable for
what he does. Only on the basis of mutual account-
ability can mutual prediction of behavior take
place, without which all social relationships would
be impossible. We know, for example, that an in-
dividual will act thus and so in a given situation
because deviation from expected behavior would
be to his discredit or disadvantage. He would be
punished, either by losing his reputation, ridicule,
or in extreme cases, expulsion. Only by accepting
responsibility (accountability) for his actions can
an individual invoke upon his fellows their com-
mon system of moral norms. Only through a mu-
tual assurance that future behavior can be pre-
dicted on the basis of past and present actions can
social relationships be preserved. But the person
who denies the concept of responsibility (free-will)
uROBERT LINDNER, MUST YOU Convo.m? Nrew
York: Rinehart and Co., 1956, p. 204.
9KENNETH S. CARLSTON, LAW AND STRUCTURES OF
SOCIAL AcTION, London: Stevens and Sons, 1956,
p. 31.
60 WALTER COUTU, EMERGENT HUMAN NATURE,
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949, p. 412.
61 SELLiN, op. cit., p. 491.
often attempts to relieve the criminal of responsi-
bility (accountability). 62
The desire on the part of the psychiatrist to
abolish certain basic concepts such as responsi-
bility, guilt, and punishment has brought the
following reply from Fredric Wertham:
The ultra-radical proposal has been made to
turn most or all offenders over to psychiatry, and
to abolish the very concepts of responsibility,
crime, punishment, and personal guilt. This is not
only impracticable, but harmful, for it deflects
our attention from the present-day abuses of
psychiatric criminology and from the fight against
them. Such an abolition of judicial categories
would in practice infringe on the safety of society
and on the rights of the individual.6
Instead of just delving into the minutiae "of
doubtful dreams" he should develop a social
orientation corresponding to the growing awareness
of social responsibility in a changing world. Instead
of the currently too-prevalent practice of giving
for social ills individualistic and therefore evasive
explanations, the psychiatrist should not shirk
his duty to determine the point where individual
guilt resolves itself into social responsibility. 64
The association of the terms "conditioned re-
sponse" and "involuntary action" is due to the
fact that Pavlovian or classical conditioning is
used as the example. B. F. Skinner and other psy-
chologists interested in learning theory have intro-
duced into psychological literature the term
"operant" or "instrumental" conditioning, based
on self-initiated or voluntary behavior on the part
of the subject. If modern psychologists, using the
latest research techniques, can use such terms as
"self-initiated" or "voluntary actions", certainly
the lawyer is justified in talking about voluntary
actions or intent.
65
Law is both descriptive, the law as it is, and
evaluative, the laying down of moral imperatives.
The study of law can be descriptive, and thus a
member of the social sciences, or it can be evalua-
tive, and thus within the field of ethics and morals.
The law regulating adultery exists as a fact, as a
code of behavior; it also represents a moral impera-
6ARNOLD GREEN, SOCIOLOGY, 2nd ed., New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956, p. 36.
6FREDRIC WERTHAM, SHOW OF VIOLENCE, New
York: Doubleday and Co., 1949, p. 18.
6Ibid., p. 18.
65 ERNEST H. HLGARD, INTRODUCTION TO PsY-
CHOLOGY, 2nd ed., New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
1957, p. 29 ff.
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tive, namely, people ought not commit adultery.
Confusion arises when law is treated exclusively
either as a fact or as a moral imperative. Very often
moral imperatives are confused with conventional
behavior. Social norms, legal and otherwise, tell
us how people ought to behave, not how they do
behave. Statistical norms are confused with norms
that establish standards of behavior. The ought
can never be derived from the is. The distinction
between the descriptive and prescriptive aspects
of law goes to the very heart of jurisprudence.66
The descriptive is often confused with the pre-
scriptive.Y7 The relationship between science and
policy is demonstrated today in the physical
sciences. Physicists were able to produce an atomic
bomb, but the moral implications of the bomb have
driven many scientists into other areas of research.
The physicist does not determine how the bomb
ought to be used. The program to produce satellites
also illustrates the difference between the scientific
knowledge necessary to launch a satellite and the
governmental policy which the United States has
pursued in an effort to do so. These examples not
only point out the gap between science and policy,
but they also point out the fact that scientists do
not determine policy. They work within the policy
framework determined by the power structure of
society.
If we make a distinction between what is and
what ought to be, and if we assign to science
questions of what is and to policy makers questions
of what ought to be, then this conflict between
law and psychiatry takes on new meaning. Psy-
chiatry is, or wants to be, a science. Law has a
policy-making function. The psychiatrist has
attacked the McNaghten rule principally on the
grounds that it is not scientific. The McNaghten
rule is not a scientific statement; it states a matter
of policy. When the psychiatrist argues that the
McNaghten rule is no longer acceptable, he is
arguing as a policy-maker, not a scientist. The
6 6 MoRRs R. ConEN, REASON AND LAW, Glencoe:
Free Press, 1950, p. 159 ff.
6 WMuIAX SEAGLE, QUEST FOR LAW, New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1941, pp. 7-17. The school of phil-
osophical jurisprudence emphasizes the ethical aspect
of law. The analytical school emphasizes the descrip-
tive aspect of law. Sociological and historical juris-
prudence attempts to relate law to the social sciences.
JEROME HALL has stated that it is a mistake to separate
law as fact and law as value. He advocates integrativejurisprudence which combines the descriptive and
evaluative aspects of law. See INTERPRETATIONS OF
MfODERN LEGAL PILosoPIEs, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1947, p. 313 ff.
sociologist has decided he could not act as both
scientist and policy-maker, and perhaps the psy-
chiatrist will find it necessary to make a similar
distinction between science and policy. It is no
refutation of a legal doctrine to observe that it is
not scientific. Law evaluates behavior and es-
tablishes norms of conduct. The criminal is one
who has been judged by the group to have violated
a conduct code and is deserving of punishment and
condemnation. Mental illness is not defined as the
violation of a conduct code. There is no scientific
approval or disapproval of mental illness, any more
than one approves or disapproves of an infected
appendix. A man may have syphilis and commit
a crime at the same time. We do not ask a lawyer
to treat the syphilis, and the doctor is not supposed
to make a moral issue of syphilis. The fact that
doctors treated syphilis as a moral and not as a
scientific issue for years illustrates the point. At
the same time we do not ask the doctor what pun-
ishment ought to be assigned to the man who has
contracted syphilis through an illegal act. In the
case of crime, however, we assume that the pres-
ence of mental disease places in the hands of psy-
chiatrists the moral evaluation of the behavior.
There is a right and wrong in law; there is no right
and wrong in science, only what is. This observa-
tion does not preclude the possibility that policy
decisions may be based on scientific evidence.
Gregory Zilboorg, a psychiatrist, makes such a
distinction between science and policy.
If we as scientific contemporaries are to pass
judgment on every contemporary social crisis in
terms of our civic reactions clothed in the cloak of
our scientific training, much of that which is posi-
tive, creative, and permanent in our science is
bound to be tarnished, as so much of the human
spirit was tarnished, whenever scientific knowledge
was made to serve the immediate ends of social
crises. This mistake is a dangerous error which
little helps our civic performances and hurts a
great deal our scientific performance and capacity.
As scientists we cannot exist unless we stand au
dessus de la inelle. If we find ourselves unable to
stand above the battle, we must give up our
scientific position. There is no choice. For there is
no socialist physics, or capitalistic algebra, or
Soviet astronomy, or Fascist biology; and there
is no American psychoanalysis or British psy-
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chiatry. Science remains universal and cosmopoli-
tan as it always has been, or it is not science."
Zilboorg goes on to state that criminals are neu-
rotic individuals, and "Such individuals should be
treated, of course, instead of punished. ' 69 Zilboorg
fails to realize that when he states we ought to
substitute treatment for punishment he is con-
tradicting what he said a few pages earlier about
the separation of science and policy and the main-
tenance of scientific neutrality on social and po-
litical issues. He also states that as a psychiatrist
he is identified "with the person to be served and
not with the disindividualized aggregate called
society or history.70 Here he is stating that he is a
positivist, that is, he is interested in the criminal
and not in social meaning of crime, guilt, and
punishment.
THE PU-RPOSE OF PUNISHMENT
The Classical School advocated a definite
penalty for each crime. The punishment must fit
the crime, e.g., for armed robbery a man would
receive five years in prison. The Classical School
punished the man for the crime, for what he had
done.
The Positive School rejected the doctrine of
nulla poena sine lege-no punishment without a
law. The Positive School emphasized individual-
ized treatment and the protection of society against
the criminal. The punishment must fit the criminal.
A man was sentenced, not according to the seri-
ousness of the offense, but according to the factor
or factors which motivated him to commit a crime.
It is foolish, reasoned the positivist, to sentence all
men guilty of armed robbery to the same length of
time, since the motivational pattern for each man
would be different. One man might commit armed
robbery because he does not have the vocational
training necessary for him to get a job; another
man might commit armed robbery because it
served him as a psychological substitute for love
which he did not receive from his parents. In the
one case the criminal would receive vocational
training; in the other case he would receive psy-
chotherapy. Since it is not possible to know at the
time of the trial how long a time will be necessary
to rehabilitate the criminal, an indefinite sentence
F GREGORY ZILBOORG, On Social Responsibility,
SEARcHLIGHTS ON DELINQUENCY, ed. by K. R. EISLER,
New York: International Universities Press, 1949,
p. 334.
61 Ibid., p. 335.70 Ibid., p. 337.
is needed, which could theoretically be from one
year to life.7' Each criminal would receive indi-
vidualized treatment according to his own psy-
chological and sociological needs. The criminal,
not the crime, governed the sentence or punish-
ment given. The time a man spent in prison would
be determined, not by the crime he had committed,
but by the time needed to adjust and rehabilitate
him. Whether or not a man was adjusted and
ready to return to society would be determined by
scientific penology.
Garofolo was skeptical about the possibility of
reforming the criminal. He advocated the death
penalty, overseas colonies, and life imprisonment
for those lacking all moral sense. For the young
offender he recommended the indeterminate sen-
tence, and for less serious violations he advocated
reparations rather than punishment.72 Garofolo
also recognized the value of the deterrence theory,
though he also realized its limitations. He also
observed that any system of enforced treatment
is punitive in nature.
73
Ferri continued the Positive School's emphasis
on social welfare and social defense. The purpose
of criminal justice was to afford maximum pro-
tection or defense of society against the criminal.
The defense of society was placed above the rights
of individuals. Ferri recommended penal colonies,
indeterminate sentences, hospitals, scientifically
trained judges, and the abolition of juries.
Although he recognized the value of individualized
treatment, he also recognized its limitations.
Individualized treatment was limited to the five
classes of criminals which he developed.7 4
The modern trend in penology has been in the
direction of positivism, with such innovations as
the indeterminate sentence, parole, probation,
suspended sentences, and good time laws.75 "The
reforms made in the criminal law in all civilized
nations in the last half century have resulted in
the adoption of many of the proposals of the
positivists." 6 For Bentham a harm or pain must
result from the crime before it is punished. The
positivist turned attention to motivation, and
punishment was related to human motivation
71 ALTER C. REcs ss states for example, The
ideal indeterninate sentence law fixes all sentences from
one year to life. WALTER C. REcKLEss, THE CRIME
PROBLEM, 2nd ed., New York: Appleton-Century-
Croft, Inc., 1955, p. 622.
7ALLEN, op. cit., p. 382 ff.
73 Ibid., p. 386.
74 SELLIN, op. cit., p. 491.7 5 HALL, PRINCIPLES, op. Cit., p. 50 ff.7 6 SELLIN, op. cit., p. 492.
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rather than to the overt act or consequence of the
act. "Motivation rather than the objective nature
of crime, is a basis for sanctions."n This attitude,
again, is illustrative of the positivist's interest in
the criminal rather than crime. The social defense
position has resulted in such legislation as sexual
psychopathic laws and habitual offender laws.
Ferri delivered a lecture entitled "New Horizons
in Criminal Law", which was later published as
Criminal Sociology. Barnes and Teeters published
New Horizons in Criminology in which they pro-
pose such reform measures as the elimination of
prisons, the elimination of punishment, the elimi-
nation of the jury system, the elimination of the
concept of free will, individualized treatment, and
the elimination of other aspects of the legal system.
Scientists and mental hospitals would replace
judges, juries, and prisons7
The abandonment of the principle of legality
often leaves the accused without the traditional
safeguards found in the law. Jerome Hall has been
an outspoken critic of this movement.79 Francis A.
Allen asks the question, "What social interests are
to be protected by the criminal law?" We must
deal with the problem of the expansion of state
power into more and more aspects of social life. 0
The late George Dession emphasized the protection
of individual rights as an important function of
criminal law. Dession deplored the development of
such legal proceedings as denaturalization of
naturalized citizens, deportation of aliens, loyalty
hearings, anti-trust proceedings, and sexual psy-
chopathic laws which allow a man to be committed
for an indefinite period even though he has com-
mitted no offense. These actions are always taken
under the disguise of social welfare. "Should not
the safeguards of criminal proceedings be applied
in the above situations?" 8' The Pioneer Series
article on Montero is relevant in this respect be-
cause Montero placed emphasis on the protection
of individual rights and the limitation of the power
of the state.
The positivist has ignored the fact that the
, Ibid., p. 481.
78 HARRY EuizR BARNES AND NEGLEY K. TEETERS,
NEW HoRizoNs IN CRIMINOLOGY, New York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1950, p. 289 ff.; p. 644 ff.; p. 947 ff.
79 HALL, PRINCOEc s, op. cit., p. 19 ff.
80 ALLEN, op. cit., p. 378.
1R acmA C. DoNNELLY, George Dession, JouR.
or Cmii. L., ClinNOL., Am POL. Sci., March-April,
1956, p. 773.
'2MANUEL LoPEz-REY, Piioeers in Criminology, X:
Pedro Dorado Montero, JouR. or CRni L., CRUmNOL.,
AND POL. Scr., January-February, 1956, p. 605 ff.
criminal law is a double-edged sword. It protects
society against the individual, and it protects the
individual against the arbitrary actions of the
state. The law prescribes the area in which the
state can act.
Criminology textbooks pay a great deal of atten-
tion to the inhumanity of man to man: the in-
humanity of punishment, the brutal methods of
torture and punishment, the ineffectiveness of
capital punishment, the complicated legal pro-
cedure followed by courts of law, the dishonesty of
judges and police officials, the injustices of trials
and jury decisions, the brutality of police methods,
and the unsavory conditions in all prisons. What
is sometimes ignored is the fact that the Classical
School developed as a reaction to harsh penal
methods where people were executed for minor
offenses. The principle of legality was a political
doctrine designed to protect the accused against
such abuses. Bentham and Beccaria led a wave of
legal reform in England.' The Positive School
places us in a major contradiction in this respect.
In order to carry out the social defense philosophy
he must sacrifice the individual offender. "The
Positive School is committed to the thesis that any
measure necessary to protect Society (the accused,
and, of course, the convicted person are auto-
matically excluded therefrom) is justifiable."' 4
In the case of the adult offender, as in the case
of the juvenile, the issue is sometimes whether the
accused has a personality problem which needs
treatment, rather than whether or not the de-
fendent has committed an objective harm. The
sexual psychopathic laws represent a movement in
this direction. "The sexual psychopathic laws have
given birth to a bastard class-neither criminal
or insane-whose members are designated
"offenders" because of their offensive behavior.
These unhappy nonconformists may be punished
or treated just as badly as the criminal and the
insane, but obtain far less in the way of due proc-
ess of law."" 5 Hermann Mannheim, E. H.
Sutherland, and Paul Tappan have criticized the
sexual psychopathic laws in this country.'6 Harsh
penal methods are now appearing under the guise
of "reform" and "science".
It is often stated that the purpose of criminal
law ought to be treatment and reform. The ob-
83 GEIs, op. cit., pp. 159-171; MNOAcHEsi, op. cit.,
p. 439-449.
8 HALL, PRmNCIPLEs, op. cit., pp. 550-551.
85 UNvExsrrY or CmcAoo LAw REvImw, p. 355.
86 MANNim, op. cit., p. 205 ff.
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servation has been made that there is always a
punitive aspect to treatmentY Whether or not
punishment and treatment can be separated is a
relevant question. Sheldon Glueck once com-
mented, "A sick person has a right not to be
treated; it is only when he becomes contagious
that he may be quarantined."' s
The reform argument assumes that reform is
possible, and that we have the knowledge neces-
sary to reform the criminal. This argument assumes
we know the cause of crime and therefore the cure.
It overworks the analogy between crime and
disease.89 It overlooks the fact that crime is a
product of society. In his book, "Must You
Conform?", the late Robert Lindner argues that
when we classify homosexuality as a disease and
not a crime we are not really helping the homo-
sexual but are in fact creating new oppressive
measures to use against him. It is control disguised
as reform and treatment. The same thing can be
said for regarding behavior of other types as a dis-
ease rather than a crime. If crime is the product of
society, do we reform the individual or must we
reform the society?
The rehabilitative treatment of the offender is
the objective most frequently discussed and ap-
plauded today. Criminological positivism, with
its focus upon the individual offender, was intro-
duced by Lombroso and his followers. An indi-
vidualized and, more particularly, a therapeutic
orientation has developed rather steadily in sub-
sequent years under the impetus of the modern
clinical movement .... The focus upon mental
pathology has resulted in a conception of criminals
as "sick people". 90
The positivist emphasizes parole and the inde-
terminate sentence, yet a determinate sentence
has more value than does the indeterminate sen-
tence as a factor in success or failure of parole. 9'
Sweating out a parole and observing the political
maneuvers of parole boards is very demoralizing
to an inmate. Many inmates feel that a release on
parole automatically lessens one's chances of re-
forming after release from prison. "Society is not
yet fulfilling its responsibility to the implications
87 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, p. 350 ff.
88 HENRY NuNBERG, Problems in the Structure of the
Juvenile Court, JouR. OF CrM. L., CRIMINOL., AND
PoL. Sci., January-February, 1958, p. 507.
19 CoHEN, op. cit., p. 55; HALL, PRINCiPLEs, op. cit.,
p. 132.
'
9 PAUL W. TAPPAN, CONTEmI'ORARY CORREcTION,
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951, pp. 110-111.
9' REcsaxss, op. cit., pp. 637-639.
of parole." 9' - Today the Youth and Adult Authori-
ties are held in high esteem by penologists. The
American Law Institute was instrumental in the
establishment of these agencies. The Model Cor-
rection Act removed from the courts the power of
probation and placed the offender in the hands of
the Authority for an indeterminate period for
which there is neither a minimum or a maximum.9'
"It seems to many that this feature of the model
Act is extreme and even dangerous, in view of the
possibility of miscarriages of justice, as well as
mistakes in judgment."94 The arguments against
the indeterminate sentence are many and varied. 9 '
Alexander Maconochie, the British reformer,
emphasized the importance of the indeterminate
sentence, but as John Barry noted in his article,
"Maconochie would have been surprised at the
arbitrary powers entrusted to tribunals such as the
Adult and Youth Authorities and Parole
Boards."96 The emphasis has shifted from a rigid
sentencing procedure which did not take into
account individual factors, to an indeterminate
sentence which does not take into account the
rights of individuals. Perhaps we can find a com-
promise between such two extremes. At least it is
difficult to justify the indeterminate sentence and
parole as "reform measures".
The modern criminologist places little value on
the deterrent theory of punishment, though both
Lombroso and Garofolo realized the deterrent
effect of criminal law. They placed more emphasis
on overseas colonies and capital punishment than
on reform.Y As Morris R. Cohen points out, we
cannot say that law does not deter because some
individuals commit crimes.9' The notion that law
does not deter is fatalistic and this conflicts with
the positivist's concept of determinism. 9
The optimum result in treatment cannot be
attained by mere reaffirmations of faith in "indi-
vidualization" and "therapy", or by the elabora-
9' DONALD F. WmsoN, MY Six CoNvicTs, New
York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1951, p. 281.
93 BLOcH AND FLYNN, op. cit., p. 490.
94 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY, ed. by VERNON
C. BRANHAM AND SAMUEL B. KUTASH, New York:
Philosophical Library, 1949, p. 465.
95 CALDWELL, op. cit., p. 644 if; EDwiN H. SUTHER-
LAND AND DONALD R. CRESSEY, P~iNcnPLEs OF CRIM-
INOLOGY, 5th ed., New York: J. P. Lippincott, 1955,
p. 560 ff.
96 JOHN V. BARRY, Pioneers in Criminology, XII:
Alexander Maconocie, JouR. OF Cumi. L.,
CR- [NOL., AND POL. Sci., July-August, 1956, p. 150.
w ALLEN, op. cit., p. 373 ff.




tion of case histories. It cannot be achieved, either,
by a cavalier rejection of the incapacitative and
deterrent objectives of correction in favor of an
exclusively rehabilitative goal."'
In the case of punishment, as in the case of re-
sponsibility, there is a confusion of what is and
what ought to be. The question of punishment is a
moral issue. The sociologist and psychiatrist do
not hesitate in suggesting what ought to be done
with the offender. At its conception American
sociology was dominated by a philosophy of social
reform; however, this aspect of sociological think-
ing has been modified since that time. In criminol-
ogy the reform issue still looms large, and the
criminologist is more often than not more of a
reformer than a scientist. Science can tell us that
executing some criminals will not deter others; it
cannot tell us that we ought not to execute them.
One of the major difficulties encountered in crimi-
nology when we deal with ethical issues is that the
sociological positivist and the legal positivist
divorce fact and ethics.Y" This does not mean that
the positivist does not make ethical judgments; it
means that he makes ethical judgments without
acknowledging that he is making them. Crimi-
nology is a science; law is a policy making pro-
cedure.
Perhaps the most glaring defect in the socio-
logical analysis of punishment is that it views
punishment always in the context of what it means
to the individual offender, never in terms of what it
means to society. Because the positivist is con-
cerned with the individual offender, it should be
expected that he would neglect the sociological
meaning of punishment. The social purpose of
punishment is to create social solidarity. Emile
Durkheim viewed punishment as a reflection of
group solidarity. Any act which violated the social
code had to be punished in order to restore order
and to reaffirm the violated code. In this way group
solidarity was maintained. 0 2
Since sanctions are not revealed by analysis
of the act that they govern, it is apparent that I
am not punished simply because I did this or that.
It is not the intrinsic nature of my action that
produces the sanction which follows, but the fact
that the act violates the rule which forbids it. In
100TAPPAN, CONTEMPORARY ComxcTION, op. Cit.,
p. 12.
101 HALL, P2RlNcrPLEs, op. cit., p. 546.
X WALTR A. LuNDEN, Pioneers in Criminology,
XVI: Enile Durkheim, Jomu. op Ciu i. L., CumzNoL.,
AND POL. Sc., May-June, 1958, p. 5 ff.
fact, one and the same act, identically performed
with the same material consequences, is blamed or
not blamed according to whether or not there is a
rule forbidding it. The existence of the rule and the
relation to it of the act determine the sanction.
Thus homicide, committed in time of peace, is
freed from blame in time of war. An act, in-
trinsically the same, which is blamed today among
Europeans, was not blamed in ancient Greece,
since there it violated no pre-established rule.
We have now reached a deeper conception of
sanctions. A sanction is the consequence of an act
that does not result from the content of the act,
but from the violation by that act of a pre-es-
tablished rule. It is because there is a pre-estab-
lished rule, and the breach is a rebellion against
this rule, that a sanction is entailed.10
The purpose of punishment is social disapproval
of the act through collective action on the part of
the group. Durkheim's analysis of punishment has
the advantage of placing attention on the norma-
tive structure relating to acts and not on the act
itself. The Positive School was opposed to the
position taken by Durkheim, that is, it focused
attention on the act and not on the meaning of a
violation to the social group.
Morris R. Cohen regards reprobation or dis-
approval as an important aspect of punishment. T4
Fredric Wertham notes that a neglected but im-
portant aspect of punishment is the condemnation
of the crime. 00 Bronislaw Malinowski states,
"Every element of primitive law, every claim, is
determined by the need to maintain the identity
of the group"0 6 Arnold Green writes:
The second proposition-that punishment fails
to reform the criminal-is also inconsequential in
the present context. The real social function of
punishment is not so much to change the behavior
of the extreme rebel as it is to give the majority of
more or less norm-accepting persons a continued
reason for remaining norm-accepting. As many
sociologists, including Emile Durkheim and George
H. Mead have pointed out, punishment affirms
social values. Punishment serves to set off wrong
from right. That in many instances it fails to re-
habilitate the individual offender does not destroy
103 LEwis A. CosNER AND BERNARD ROsENBERG,
SocIAL THEORY: New York: Macmillan Co., 1957, p.
108.
104 CoHEN, op. Cit., p. 50.
105 WE Ar, SHOW Or VIOL.ENCE, Op. cit., p. 19.
116 CARXToN, op. cit., p. 6.
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its essential function. Without punishment,
organized society is inconceivable.'0
Radcliffe Brown has analyzed social sanctions
in terms of their social function, and he concludes:
In a consideration of the function of social
sanctions it is not the effects of the sanction upon
the person to whom they are applied that are most
important but rather the general effects within the
community applying the sanctions. For the ap-
plication of any sanction is a direct affirmation of
social sentiments by the community and therefore
constitutes an important, perhaps essential, mecha-
nism for maintaining these sentiments. Organized
negative sanctions in particular ... are expressions
of conditions of social dysphoria brought about by
some deed. The function of the sanction is to re-
store to the social euphoria by giving definite col-
lective expression to the sentiments which have
been affected by the deed, as in the primary sanc-
tions and to some extent in the secondary sanc-
tions, or by removing a conflict within the com-
munity itself. The sanctions are thus of primary
significance to sociology in that they are reactions
on the part of the community to events affecting
its integration. °H
The use of punishment by society is not as im-
portant in terms of whether or not it reforms the
individual as in terms of what it does for society.
Punishment creates social solidarity and re-en-
forces the social norms.
CONCLusrONS
In the Pioneers in Criminology we witness the
development of the major issues underlying
modern criminological thinking. Whereas the
Classical School focused attention on the crime, the
Positive School shifted the emphasis to the
criminal. The major characteristic of criminological
thinking since Lombroso's time is the preoccupa-
tion of criminologists with the problem "why do
individuals commit crimes?"
The Positive School gained its name from the
positivist philosophy of the nineteenth century
which applied scientific method to social problems.
This school maintained the position that crimi-
nology must become scientific, by which they
meant that the explanation of criminal behavior
and the treatment of criminals must be accom-
107 GREEN, op. cit., p. 37.101EDGAR F. BORGETTA AND HENRY J. MEYER,
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1956, p. 443 ff.
plished by scientific means. Science is designed to
explain why people behave the way they do; it
does not tell us how people ought to behave. The
reason we have crime, however, is not because in-
dividuals behave the way they do, but because
others think they ought not to behave in that way
and have it within their power to judge their be-
havior. Crime involves an ethical issue.
The biological explanation of behavior has been
seriously challenged by sociologists and psychol-
ogists since Lombroso's time. This tenet of posi-
tivism has been refuted. However, the crimi-
nologist has accepted a theory of behavior as a
theory of crime. Crime and criminal behavior are
confused. Even though in modern criminology the
Lombrosian explanation of behavior is rejected,
the positivist's interest in the criminal is main-
tained.
Because the positivist wanted to study the crimi-
nal rather than crime, he was obliged to reject the
legal definition of crime. "Anti-social behavior" is
often used in place of a legal definition. There is no
agreement among criminologists as to the meaning
of the term "crime", though this is presumably
the starting point for any research. Some use a
social definition of behavior; some use a legal defini-
tion of behavior. Some regard the sociology of law
as outside the scope of criminology; some regard
it as basic to criminological theory.
The scientific approach substituted determinism
for volition. The individual criminal is again the
center of attention, since the question is one of
individual responsibility. Although Ferri used the
concept of legal responsibility in place of moral
responsibility, the individualistic approach is
gaining headway in law as evidenced in the recent
Durham decision.
The Positive School regarded the protection of
society as the governing factor in punishment.
Punishment was designed to fit the criminal, not
the crime. Such reform measures as parole, proba-
tion, and indeterminate sentences furthered the
individualistic approach to criminology. The ob-
jection to the social defense school comes from
those who do not want social welfare placed above
individual welfare. Individualized treatment must
of necessity place great discretionary power in the
hands of the experts.
The Positive School advanced the field of crimi-
nology by placing the study of the criminal within
a scientific framework. Today, as a result, we know
a great deal more about the criminal than we have
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known heretofore. The criticisms made of the
positivist are to be viewed as attempts to raise
questions other than those raised by this school,
and not as a blanket condemnation of a healthy
interest shown in the criminal. The criminologist's
attempt to separate criminology and criminal
law, and his related attempt to derive criminality
from the behavior of the criminal offer a major
obstacle to a theory of crime. More attention needs
to be paid to the meaning of crime in terms of
criminal law, social structure, and social change.
A re-evaluation of the theoretical structure of
criminology is called for at this period in the de-
velopment of criminological thinking.
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